Introduction
In the wake of the post-Cold War era, Japan faced
a series of major challenges to its security policy. In the Gulf War,
Japan’s huge economic contribution could neither win appreciation
from Kuwait nor dilute criticism from other countries for not contributing
military personnel. In East Asia, North Korea launched a Rodong missile
in Japan’s own backyard and declared its withdrawal from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty in 1993. In 1994, North Korea rejected IAEA
inspection and began drawing fuel from its nuclear reactors. The US
called for economic sanctions and blockades against North Korea to manage
this crisis, and even considered a preemptive air strike. In 1996, tensions
in the Taiwan Strait heightened when China conducted massive military
exercises near Taiwan, and in response the US deployed two aircraft
careers in the strait.
Facing these challenges, Japanese people inevitably started to engage
in political debates over Japanese security policy. Those arguments
included whether Japan should take a more active role in global security
and pursue a more independent foreign policy from the US, whether Japan
should change its stance toward the right of collective security, and
whether the constitution should be amended. A review of Japan’s
defense policy and strategy was conducted by the Advisory Group on Defense
Issues for Prime Minister Hosokawa, which submitted a report “The
Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: the Outlook
for the 21st Century” to Prime Minister Murayama in 1994.
The US also had been facing the need to formulate a new strategy to
manage security challenges in the post-Cold War world. Domestically,
growing concerns over the bad economy fostered mistrust and fear towards
Japan. There was a huge divide in academic and political debates over
US security policy in the Asia-Pacific region between those who support
the continuous forward presence in East Asia, and those who advocate
the retreat from Japan.
The two governments chose to strengthen bilateral security ties between
them despite of, or as a result of, such debates. Beginning with the
‘Nye Initiative,’ which emphasized the importance of the
US forward presence in Asia and its alliance with Japan, Japan revised
the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), putting more emphasis on
security cooperation with the US. President Clinton and Prime Minister
Hashimoto re-confirmed the importance of the US-Japan Security Treaty
in the post-Cold War world in the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security
in 1996. Following that, the two governments approved the new Guidelines
for US-Japan Defense Cooperation.
This paper will focus on two related questions regarding the strengthened
US-Japan tie in the 1990s. What are strategic calculations of the
US and Japan behind the re-strengthening of security ties? The
North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994 seemingly initiated the series of
re-confirmation of US-Japan security cooperation(1),
I would like to go beyond a North Korea factor, and look at general
strategic thoughts for the post-Cold War world that drove the two countries
towards the revision of the guidelines.
Relating to the first question, Did the new guidelines change Japan’s
military role and the nature of the Security Treaty? There are
two competing perspectives towards the guidelines: Japan expanded its
security and military role in the region through the revision of the
guidelines; and the guidelines reinforced the limits on Japan’s
military and security role. My argument is that Japan’s military
role in the region has not significantly changed. I will also argue
that the nature of the Security Treaty did not change since Japan d
id not approve the right of collective defense despite significant pressures
to approve it. Eventually, the revision of the Guidelines reflects the
fact that Japan is still heavily constrained and cannot conduct any
significant military activity despite the growing awareness that Japan
should take more responsibility in international security issues.
(1)For example, Murata p.26, and Green
(2000) p.244
Strategic Calculations of the United States
The main motivation of the US to re-confirm the security tie with Japan
derives from its own strategic calculations. The main function of the
treaty with Japan to contain the Soviet Union was no longer necessary
as the Cold War ended. However, a cold war still remains in the Korean
Peninsula, and there are other destabilizing factors in this region,
such as the Taiwan issue and territorial disputes over small islands
in the region.
The Gulf War and consequential strategic thinking made clear the importance
and necessity of maintaining the security treaty with Japan despite
the end of the Cold War. The Gulf War had a considerable influence on
the strategic thinking of the US. First, it demonstrated that the US
still faces military challenges in the post-Cold War era. As the National
Security Strategy addresses, the Gulf War was “a forceful reminder
that there are still autonomous sources of turbulence in the world.”(2)
The US realized that it needs to keep sufficient and advanced military
capability to deter or respond to those threats. Second, there was a
growing fear that the post-Cold War era would become chaotic. Many argued
that a new order in the post-Cold War era must be established.(3)
With the self-recognition as “the only truly global strength,”(4)
the US started regarding itself as responsible for formulating the new
order. Third, the experience of the Gulf War confirmed that the Soviet
(or Russia) no longer tries to oppose the US, but China still tries
to keep a political leverage. China did not veto, but abstained on the
Security Council Resolution 678, which allowed the multinational forces
in the Middle East to use force against Iraq.(5)
The US National Security Strategy since the Gulf War reflects these
considerations. First, US focus shifted from containment of the peer
military rival to maintenance of regional stability. Second, the US
started to prepare for two major theater wars (MTW). In this scenario,
the US assumes that simultaneous occurrence of one major theater war
in the Middle East, a war equivalent to Desert Storm, and another major
theater war in the Korean Peninsula, a war equivalent to the Korean
War. In preparation for this scenario, the US emphasizes not only the
importance of maintaining a sufficient amount of military forces and
highly advanced military capabilities, but also the forward military
presence in key regions, and the cooperation of allied countries.(6)
The importance of US military presence in Japan was especially emphasized
as their concern towards China grew. Their concern towards China reflects
in the ‘Nye Report’ (or “East Asia Strategic Report”)
of 1995, which put strong stress on the need to respond to China’s
growing military power. Funahashi sees the ‘Nye Initiative’
as his proposal of ‘engagement policy’ toward China as a
post-Cold War strategy of the US, in comparison to George Kennan’s
Article X, which proposed ‘containment policy’ toward the
Soviet Union in the beginning of the Cold War.(7)
The Gulf War and the North Korean crisis made the US aware that the
operational aspects of the treaty were becoming increasingly important
while deterrence and balancing of regional powers remained crucial.
The US-Japan alliance was primarily a political alliance against the
Communist bloc during the Cold War as Green argues,(8)
and the political aspect remains essential in the context of ‘engagement’
in China. However, the crises in the early 1990s demonstrated that neither
is the operational aspect of the Security Treaty strong enough to respond
to unpredictable contingencies effectively, nor is Japan capable of
making a political decision as quickly as it should be.(9)
The old guidelines adopted in 1978 stipulate that the US and Japan should
conduct the study of contingency scenarios within and outside of Japan.
However, it had been focusing mainly on scenarios of a contingency within
the Japanese territories.(10) The crisis in North
Korea in 1994 revealed the reality that a contingency occurring outside
Japan was more likely than one within the Japanese territories.
Moreover, the war scenarios that the US prepared during the crisis showed
how critical the lack of contingency studies was. The US prepared a
contingency plan for bombing Yongbyon in case that North Korea would
refuse to stop the operation of nuclear facilities there. The Pentagon
shaped three war options, which ranged from the immediate dispatch of
2,000 troops to Korea to more serious preparations such as the deployment
of tens of thousands of ground troops and massive combat air power.(11)
In planning these options, the Pentagon faced two concerns according
to Oberdorfer. The first one was the difficulty of calculating how Pyongyang
might react. US officials knew neither Pyongyang’s nuclear intentions,
nor how Pyongyang was gauging the political signals that the US had
been sending. The other concern was the difficulty of calculating whether
Japan would assist the US military, and if it would, how. US officials
understood that Japan had still been mired in the constraints from the
experience of the Gulf War. Let alone the rear area logistic support,
they were anxious even about whether Japan would accept 80,000 American
civilians who would need to be evacuated from Korea since Japan had
not agreed to receive them.(12)
Thus, from a strategic viewpoint, the US needed to maintain the Security
Treaty with Japan in order to maintain the forward presence of military
forces in East Asia, and it was in its crucial interests to improve
the operational capacity of the treaty and prepare for contingencies
in a practical manner.
(2)The White House, National Security
Strategy of the United States (1991)
(3)Owada, p.7
(4)The White House, National Security
Strategy of the United States (1991)
(5)ibid.
(6)The White House, National Security Strategy for Enlargement
and Engagement (1996)
(7)Funahashi p.29
(8)Green (1998), p.24
(9)See Giarra and Nagashima p.99
(10)Tanaka, p.344
(11)ibid., p.323-325
(12)ibid., p.325-326
US Domestic Concerns and Nye Initiative
Though the US had strategic interests in maintaining
the Security Treaty, the main political trend and the pervading anti-Japanese
sentiment did not make it easy to take such an approach.
Relations with Japan were weakening tremendously in the early 1990s.
Trade frictions with Japan had been becoming severe since Japan became
a global economic power in 1980s. As Clinton linked national security
with economic issues and set the first priority of his agenda as economic
and trade issues, the anti-Japanese atmosphere within the US government
grew. Complaints about Japan’s trade policy led to an eruption
of criticism toward Japan’s defense policy. The huge gap between
what Japan is expected to provide in proportion to its national economic
power and what Japan actually provides created distrust towards Japan
among government officials and the public.(13)
Especially because American people became “tired of the burdens
of the Cold War and were looking forward to an elusive ‘peace
dividend,’”(14) Japan’s reluctance
and inability to cooperate in military activities in the Gulf War further
deepened mistrust towards Japan.(15) According
to a public opinion poll conducted in 1991, in response to the question
of whether Japan is an ally that can be trusted militarily, 40.1% of
American people answered that they did “not think so at all.”(16)
Some academic scholars, not only economists but also political scientists,(17)
also argue that Japan would become strong enough to pose a threat to
the US if the US continues to provide security protection to Japan.
The extreme view of Friedman and LeBard demonstrates some were even
fearful of Japan’s military capabilities.(18)
Tsuchiyama defined the Americans’ concerns over growing Japan
as a “dilemma of prosperity,”(19)
in which one country’s actions to pursue economic interests harm
the other’s security interests. This dilemma had been growing
and becoming more and more problematic since the public main concern
over security issues had shifted from ‘strategies’ to ‘costs’.(20)
To solve this dilemma, Nye and others who recognized the strategic importance
of the bilateral treaty with Japan needed to somehow separate security
issues from trade issues.(21) They also needed
to show that the costs of maintaining a forward presence would be lower
than those of retreating the military forces from Japan, and that Japan
would share more in the burden. The Nye Initiative was presented to
serve such political objectives and save the Security Treaty from other
domestic interests.
Some argue that the Nye Initiative also tried to reverse a trend in
Japanese politics that favored a multilateral approach and a foreign
policy more independent from the US. They argue that in the eyes of
Nye and other US officials who recognized the importance of the bilateral
relations, the report submitted by the Advisory Group in 1994 put too
much emphasis on multilateral security cooperation and peacekeeping
operations of the United Nations,(22) even though
the report did not dismiss the importance of the bilateral treaty.(23)
There might be a fear that Japanese people were losing confidence in
the US commitment to Japanese security in the course of ‘Japan
bashing’ and ‘Japan passing’ by the US.
Thus, the objective of the Nye Initiative was to stop the spiral effects
of mutual mistrust between Japan and the US. Nye’s intention was
successfully served and he could initiate the step-by-step re-confirmation
of the treaty by the two governments. Though the debate over the importance
of the forward presence continued as represented by the debate between
Chalmers Johnson and E. B. Keehn vs. Joseph Nye,(24)
he successfully protected the treaty and re-strengthened the alliance.
This trend was not reversed even after the Okinawa incident in which
three American soldiers raped a twelve-year-old schoolgirl in 1995 led
to huge protests against US military presence in Okinawa and to a strong
anti-American sentiment in Japan.
(13)See Leitch, Kato and Weinstein,
p.184
(14)Stokes, p.288
(15)Levin, p.213 “Already many
in the United States have linked Japan’s minimal efforts in the
gulf…toward festering trade disputes and resentments, a particularly
volatile linkage given the current American emphases on “fairness,”
“equity,” and the “sharing” of international
security “burdens.””
(16)Nihon Keizai Shinbun, December 7,
1991, p.9
(17)For example, Calleo, Huntington,
Wallerstein, Chalmers Johnson and Keehn
(18)See Friedman and LeBard
(19)Tsuchiyama, p.49
(20)Sato p.97
(21)See Funahashi
(22)See Mochizuki, or Zhang and Montaperto,
pp.40-44
(23)See A. Watanabe
(24)Nye, and Johnson and Keehn
Strategic Calculations of Japan
As the Cold War ended, Japanese people further developed
two expectations that had been growing during the Cold War era. The
first expectation was that the United Nations would function more effectively
in the post-Cold War era. We can find evidence in Japan’s Diplomatic
Bluebooks that Japan was expecting that the UN would take more responsibility
of implementing global-wide collective security.(25)
The second expectation was that Japan would be able to continue contributing
to global security by economic means instead of military forces. It
is not surprising that the Japanese expected to see a world that puts
less value on military power after the end of the Cold War in the same
way as a lot of Americans did.
Japan was motivated to strengthen its ties with the US because these
expectations were proven wrong through the Gulf War and the North Korean
crisis. As for the first expectation in multilateralism, though it still
maintains a strong affinity to the UN, Japan came to recognize the reality
in which the UN still faces as many obstacles as it did during the Cold
War era. Owada warns in a report edited by Japan’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs that “[i]t is extremely perilous…to conclude
that the age of the UN as a panacea for solving problems has dawned”(26)
even though the UN seemed to function well in the Gulf War. Japan’s
desire to create a multilateral institution for security cooperation
in East Asia contributed to the establishment of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) in 1994. However, the diverse backgrounds and interests
of Asian countries and deep mistrust towards each other have been preventing
ARF from growing to be an institution like the OSCE. The ineffectiveness
of the multilateral approach became clear even to strong advocates of
multilateralism when it could neither prevent nor respond effectively
to the Korean crisis.
The other expectation that Japan could contribute to global security
by economic contributions was soon deflated in the Gulf War. As Green
argues, “[w]ith the end of the cold war, many in Japan expected
to earn alliance partnership through international economic contributions,
but the 1990-1991 Gulf War demonstrated that the United States and the
world still measured security in the traditional currency of military
force.”(27) From the painful experience
of the Gulf War, Japan not only learned the necessity of contributing
both by economic and military means, but also recognized the frustration
of people in some foreign countries, especially in the US, about Japan’s
‘one country pacifism.’
In the meantime, Japan has had to manage the same threats as the US
has in East Asia. There is a growing concern about China’s expanding
military capabilities since the 1980s. Vice Director General of Defense
Agency Nishihiro reportedly tried to set up a strategic dialogue with
US officials to talk about its strategy with respect to a more powerful
China.(28) As the North Korean crisis clearly
showed, Japan has also been facing a serious threat from North Korea.
Japan inevitably realized the necessity and importance of the bilateral
security tie with the US.
The need for regional contingency studies became even more serious for
the Japanese government. As already mentioned, the previous guidelines
did not give realistic guidance to Japan and the US to respond to a
real crisis in North Korea in 1994. The crisis reminded everyone that
Japan did not have an institutional capacity to adjust to a crisis situation
quickly because of the various constraints on military actions. When
the US was about to start a military build-up against North Korea in
1994, Japan drew up a list of 1,900 items of potentially needed assistance,
and set up a special headquarters to define what it would be able to
do.(29) However, this was extremely challenging
for the Japanese government, especially because it had to deal with
the legal and political constraints on its military capabilities, and
fill the gap between what it would need to do and what it could do in
a very short period of time.
The Japanese also learned that it would be “entrapped in a military
contingency on the Korean peninsula”(30)
in any case, no matter how ready it is.
It was strategically important to ease the complaints of the Americans
about the asymmetric burden of the alliance and show ‘sincerity’
in order to build closer security ties. On a political level, Japan
wanted to demonstrate their strong ties and deter both China and North
Korea. On an operational level, Japan also needed serious contingency
studies that have been put off since the Mitsuya Study Incident in 1965,
in which a Socialist criticized a contingency study for a military crisis
in the Korean Peninsula as an example of the eroding civilian control
of the military.(31)
Out of these considerations, Japan responded to the
Nye Initiative enthusiastically, revised the NDPO, issued the Joint
Security Declaration, and revised the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense
Cooperation. This process of re-strengthening the security tie between
the US and Japan was not something the US forced or imposed on Japan,
but it was a product of the mutual recognition of each other’s
needs and interests.
(25)See Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Diplomatic Bluebook 1992 pp.49-59, Diplomatic Bluebook 1993 and
Diplomatic Bluebook 1994
(26)Owada
(27)Green (2000), p.244
(28)Funahashi (1997), p.27
(29)Oberdorfer, p.319,320
(30)Murata, p.30
(31)T.Watanabe
Expansion of Japan’s Military and Security Role?
Now I would like to look at whether it was America
and /or Japan’s intention to change Japan’s military and
security role in East Asia through the process of re-strengthening the
security tie and the revision of the Guidelines. There are two competing
arguments, especially regarding the revision of the Guidelines: Japan
expanded its security and military role in the region; and the Guidelines
re-confirmed and reinforced the limits on Japan’s military and
security role.
The argument that Japan expanded its military role significantly by
these events in 1990s is somewhat misleading. First of all, it is wrong
to say that Japan expanded military capabilities by the revision of
the NDPO and the Guidelines. The new NDPO pledges to “make the
SDF more rational, effective and compact,”(32)
and in fact, the size of the Self Defense Forces was scaled down. Secondly,
people often argue that Japan expanded its security role in the region
since the new NDPO and Guidelines stipulate that Japan help US forces
in a contingency outside of Japan. It is true that the Security Treaty
is now officially recognized as to serve regional stability, rather
than to simply protect Japan. However, it was already regarded as serving
to balance the regional powers and maintain stability in the region
even before the Cold War ended. I would argue that the rationale of
‘re-defining’ the goal of the treaty did not come from a
change in the nature of the treaty, but rather from the necessary to
give a new rhetoric to the treaty in the post-Cold War. In other words,
it was a strategy of US and Japanese officials to give a new rhetoric
to the treaty so that they can maintain their close security ties with
each other despite the end of the Cold War.(33)
Finally, it is true that the SDF have been integrated into US military
action plans at the operational level. Japan and the US finally started
contingency studies in areas outside of Japan that had been postponed
because of JapanÅfs ambiguous stance towards the right of collective
self-defense. Though some people might regard this as an expansion of
Japan’s military role, the SDF’s roles, which are strictly
limited to logistic support and evacuation of civilians in the areas
that are “distinguished from where combat operations are being
conducted,” have not changed significantly.
I would argue that those events initiated by the US and Japan in the
1990s, especially the revision of the Guidelines, revealed that Japan
still faces significant political constraints on its military and security
role in the region. Considering the amount of pressures on Japan to
play a more active role in the region, the limited terms that are used
in the new Guidelines and its unchanged official posture toward the
right of collective defense and the interpretation of the constitution
rather demonstrate this limitation very well.
(32)National Defense Program Outline
(http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou/index_e.htm)
(33)A. Watanabe also argues that the
Advisory Group’s report in 1994 tried to re-interpret the Security
Treaty in the context of regional and multilateral security in order
to maintain the treaty.
Japan’s Right of Collective Self-Defense
The main limitation on Japan’s military role comes from the constitution,
which is officially interpreted as prohibiting Japan from exercising
the right of collective self-defense. The process of re-strengthening
the security tie was actually a great timing for Japan to re-claim the
right of collective defense in ‘realist’ term. The public
became more aware of a threat of a war that would involve Japan.(34)
People had been recognizing the necessity of contributing to global
and regional stability by non-economic means since the traumatizing
experience of the Gulf War. Voices that support a more active security
role in the international arena were seemingly becoming louder.(35)
Arguments supporting the amendment of the constitution were also increasing
especially among the younger generation.
Pressures from the US to approve the right of collective defense had
been also increasing. Senator William Roth officially stated that Japan
should resolve constitutional problems over collective defense.(36)
Japan’s East Asian Strategic Review in 1997-98 also says
that “it was noteworthy that some former US government officials
involved with the US-Japan security relationship called on Japan to
approve the right of collective self-defense.”(37)
An opinion poll conducted in 1997 revealed that 47% of Americans
think Japan ought to become fully involved in any military action that
Washington initiates in the Far East on Japan’s behalf.(38)
Facing these domestic and foreign pressures and understanding the importance
of preventing and responding to a contingency in areas outside of Japan,
Japanese politicians had active debates over the necessity of approving
the right of collective self-defense. The right of collective self-defense
was discussed in Diet committee meetings 227 times between 1994 and
1999 (when the related laws were passed in the Diet).(39)
Scholars and security specialists, except for a small group, almost
agreed that it is of great importance to consider the possibility of
reclaim the right of collective defense, and that this issue would cause
a problem in future implementation of the Security Treaty and the relationship
with the US.(40)
Despite those pressures, trends, and political debates that could have
led Japan to regain the right of collective self-defense, Japan did
not reclaim it, but rather re-confirmed the limits on the range of military
activities that Japan can take in the guidelines. To the people’s
question of whether Japan regained the collective self-defense because
the guidelines include support activities responding to ‘situations
in areas surrounding Japan,’ the government repeatedly answered
that it still maintained the official view about the right of collective
self-defense, and tried to convince people that the guidelines did not
conflict with this view.(41)
There are several reasons for why the Japanese government did not (or
could not) approve the right of collective self-defense. First, concerns
over relations with neighboring countries were still strong. China had
been criticizing the 1996 Joint Declaration, claiming that it targets
China. It is not easy to explain to China and other countries why Japan
needs to regain the right of collective self-defense without worsening
relations.
Second, domestic politics had been unstable since the end of the so-called
‘55 year system’ in 1994. A non-LDP coalition was created
in 1994 for the first time since the end of US occupation, and even
after the LDP came back to power, it had to form a coalition with other
parties, including the Social Democratic Party, which had been opposing
to the SDF and the US-Japan alliance itself. Agreements on US bases
in Okinawa in the Joint Security Declaration reflected the influence
of the LDP’s coalition members at that time, Sakigake and the
SDP. Moreover, The LDP had to seek opposition support for the bills
implementing the Guidelines because the LDP, even with its coalition
partner, the Liberal Party, lacked a majority in the House of Counselors.
Besides inter-party politics, the influence of individual LDP politicians
who were active in security issues was weakening at that time.(42)
Thus, political constraints that prevented the LDP from approving the
right of collective self-defense were huge in the 1990s.
Finally, even though some point out the growing support for being a
‘normal country’ with normal military forces, the public
still had a negative feeling towards the right of collective self-defense.
Inoguchi argues that it is a psychological matter for the most Japanese
rather than a legal one.(43) According to Asahi
Shimbun’s poll, only 37% supported the government-proposed defense
cooperation bills, while 43% were against them.(44)
In another poll conducted in 2001, 46 % accepted Japan’s self-imposed
ban on the collective defense right, while 34% said Japan should be
able to exercise the right.(45)
US political leaders apparently understood these constraints that Japan
was facing. The US’s main interest in revising the Guidelines
was to clarify Japan's capabilities and create a concrete framework
for emergencies in the region. Though some politicians requested that
Japan affirm the right of collective self-defense as mentioned above,
top leaders were cautious in calling for it. Kurt Campbell, who was
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and the Pacific at that
time, emphasized in an interview by a Japanese reporter that Japan could
play an important role within the restraints of its constitution.(46)
Michael Green also argued in an interview that Japan did not necessarily
have to change the interpretation of the constitution regarding the
right of collective self-defense since improving the operational capacity
of the treaty was the main interest for the US in revising the Guidelines
even though ideally the right should be exercised.(47)
Thus, Japanese and American interests in revising the Guidelines can
be thought as to enhance the operational capacity of the Security Treaty
while not changing the nature of the Security Treaty. It is probably
right to say that the revision of the Guidelines is a result of the
‘pragmatism’ of both the Japanese and the US governments,
who tried to meet the need within the constraints that Japan has been
facing.
(34)See The Cabinet Bureau of Japan,
The Public Survey about the SDF and Defense Issues, 1997 and 1994. To
the question “Reflecting upon the current world affairs, do you
think there is a risk that Japan will be involved in a war?” 54.9%
of the people answered either “yes” or “there is some
risk” in 1997 as compared to 47.9% in 1994
(35)See Green (2000), Green (2001) for
his analysis on Japan’s tendency toward a more active security
role.
(36)Japan Economic Newswire, October
4, 1997, US senator urges Japan to review collective defense
(37)The National Institute for Defense
Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 1997-1998, p.31
(38)Mainichi Daily News, May 3, 1997
(39)Searched at Kokkai Kaigiroku Kensaku
Shisutemu (Diet Search System) http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/
(40)Such scholars include Akihiko Tanaka,
Toshiyuki Shikata, Hisahiko Okazaki, Takashi Inoguchi Tsuneo Watanabe
and so forth.
(41)Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&As
regarding the revision of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation
(42)Sekai Shuho “Shudanteki
Jieiken No Kohshi ha Hitsuyo Nai (The Exercise of the Right of Collective
Self-Defense is Not Necessary): Interview with Michael Green”
November 11, 1997
(43)Inoguchi p.89
(44)See Japan Times, “Diet finally
begins full debate on defense cooperation bills” March 16-31,
1999
(45)Jiji News, “More Japanese
Favor Nonuse of Collective Defense: Jiji Survey” November 17,
2001
(46)Sekai Shuho, “Kyanberu
Beikokubo Fukujikanho tono Ichimon Itto (Q&As with Campbell Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense)” October 14, 1997
(47)Sekai Shuho, “Shudanteki
Jieiken no Kohshi ha Hitsuyo Nai (The Exercise of the Right of Collective
Self-Defense is Not Necessary): Interview with Michael Green”
November 11, 1997
Conclusion
Facing new international situations but unchanged regional
threats in the post-Cold War world, the US decided to strengthen its
security tie with Japan, and Japan also needed to maintain a degree
of dependence on US military power. As Nye first intended, the security
tie between the US and Japan was successfully re-confirmed and strengthened
through the series of political actions. Funahashi argues that the tie
was also strengthened by sharing the experience of the whole process.(48)
Above, I raised a question of whether the new Guidelines change Japan’s
military role and the nature of the treaty. My answer to this question
is that the new guidelines did not change Japan’s military role
significantly, but rather demonstrated its limit. Considering that Japan
had many reasons to move forward towards reclaiming the right of collective
self-defense, the revised Guidelines showed that Japan is still caught
in serious constraints even though the call for becoming a ‘normal’
country is getting stronger.
Since the revision of the Guidelines in 1997, a trend in Japan in favor
of playing a more active security role in global security issues is
stronger.(49) Especially after the September 11th
incidence, Japanese people’s way of looking at security policy
has been apparently changing. The relatively quick reaction (compared
to the past) of Prime Minister Koizumi was highly evaluated by American
Japan watchers.(50) The interim report submitted
last year by the Research Commission of the Constitution to the Diet
also supports the revision of Article 9.(51)
In relation with the US, however, there is a concern over a growing
nationalistic sentiment in Japan. Tokyo Metropolitan Governor Shintaro
Ishihara, a comic writer Kobayashi Yoshinori and other right-wing writers
have been exceedingly popular and influential, especially among the
younger generation. Their advocacy of ‘regaining national pride’
and ‘being assertive to the US’ might foster anti-American
feelings among the public. In the US, desires of correcting Japan’s
‘cheap ride’ on US security guarantee still pervade among
the public, and they might “expect Japan to pay the full costs
(and assume fuller risks) necessary to preserve regional peace and security.”(52)
Criticism that the new Guidelines “do little to ensure significant
Japanese contributions in the case of a conflict that threatens Japanese
and US interests”(53) still prevails among
many US scholars. Such a nationalistic sentiment in Japan and continued
frustrations in the US might harm bilateral relations in the future.
The revised Guidelines have not been tested in a real North Korean crisis
yet. Military specialists point out that the new Guidelines do not provide
a sufficient framework at ‘the true moment’ of crisis. Implementation
of the new Guidelines should be examined not only in respect to technical
and operational capabilities, but also in the context of changing regional
and world politics. The implications of the current trend of US unilateralism
to the new Guidelines also need to be examined.
(48)Funahashi p.45
(49)For example, in the policy reports
of the LDP and the JDP, both of them advocate to reclaiming the right
of collective self-defense. Keizai Doyukai (the Japan Association of
Corporate Executives) also express their support for changing Japan’s
view on the right to collective self-defense. Also see Schoppa p. 121
(50)Heginbotham and Samuels say that
the Koizumi’s decision does not reflect Japan’s desire to
become ‘a normal country’ but it was out of pragmatic calculations
of national interests.
(51)Asahi Shinbun Editorial
November 2nd, 2002
(52)See Samuels and Twomey p.13
(53)ibid, p.12
Bibliography